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FIVE ADVANCES 
Major advances in the evolutionary explanation of behavior and emo­
tions from the second half of the 20th century have yet to be fully 
applied in psychiatry. This chapter summarizes those advances and how 
understanding them can make clinicians and researchers more effec­
tive. Some have direct applications, such as understanding the human 
mating system, how negative emotions are useful, and why there are no 
common alleles with large effects on highly heritable diseases such as 
schizophrenia. However, the big payoffs in the long run will come from 
the integrated framework evolution provided for understanding normal 
behavior and psychopathology. Evolutionary approaches are not an 
alternative to understanding mechanisms, they are the crucial comple­
ment that explains why mechanisms are the way they are, and why they 
are vulnerable to failure. Evolutionary biology provides a framework 
that can transform the bio-psycho-social model from a catch phrase 
into a solid working model. It provides, for psychiatry, what physiology 
provides for the rest of medicine-an understanding of normal func­
tioning as the foundation for understanding pathology. 
Five major advances in evolutionary biology are especially 
important for psychiatry. Each is described briefly below. 
Proximate and Evolutionary 
Explanations Are Both Essential 
Until the middle of the 20th century, the study of animal behavior was 
mostly descriptive. Meticulous observations by ethologists described 
rnJ Table 4.1-1. 
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behavior in detail, but theory was absent. Everything changed in the 
rnid-1960s, with recognition that all biological traits need evolution­
ary as well as proximate explanations. This insight came first from 
students of animal behavior, especially Nico Tinbergen. So-called 
"proximate questions" are about mechanisms; answers to such ques­
tions describe how mechanisms work, and how they develop . Other 
"evolutionary questions" are about how traits got to be the way they 
are; answers to such questions describe how and why the trait has 
changed over evolutionary time. For instance, a proximate explana­
tion of anxiety describes the relevant brain and psychological mech­
anisms, how they develop, and how they are influenced by events 
and environmental influences. However, even describing every detail 
about the proximate mechanism does not explain why the capacity 
for anxiety exists at all. That requires an evolutionary explanation 
of how the capacity for anxiety increased fitness for our ancestors. 
In a famous article published in 1963, Tinbergen outlined four 
questions that all must be answered to have a complete understanding 
of any trait. Two are evolutionary questions. The first is about phylog­
eny, the history of a trait. The other is about the adaptive significance 
of the trait and what forces of selection shaped it. There are also 
two proximate questions. One is about the mechanism and how it 
works at all levels, from molecules to social psychology. The other is 
about ontogeny, how the mechanism develops in an individual from 
a zygote to an adult (Table 4.1-1 ). Almost all research in psychiatry 
has been to describe mechanisms, their development, and their mal­
functions. Only now is attention turning to also address evolutionary 
questions such as why emotions exist. 
Evolutionary Explanations 
for Individual Behavior 
The second core advance, closely related, was the application of evo­
lutionary thinking to behavior. Initial approaches provided evolution­
ary explanations for specific behaviors, such as rams butting horns 
in the mating season, and birds removing broken shells from nests 
to avoid attention from predators. It was soon recognized, however, 
Two Objects of Explanation 
Deyelopmentai/H istorical Single Form 
A sequence that results in the trait The trait at one slice in time 
Two kinds of Proximate Ontogeny Mechanism 
explanation Describes the mechanism and its How does the trait develop in What is the structure of the trait; 
ontogeny individuals? how does it work? 
Evolutionary Phylogeny Adaptive significance 
Describes adaptive significance and What is the phylogeny of the trait? How have variations in the trait 
phylogeny influenced fitness? 
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that it was not behavio rs themselves that natu ral selection shap ed, but 
behavior regulation mechani sms. That is, the brain . 
A general core principle soon became clear: Brains are shaped 
by natural selection to give rise to behavior that maximizes Dar-
winian fitness. Instead of implying rigid beha vio r patterns, this prin-
ciple recogn izes the enormous fitness benefits of flexib le behavio rs 
that allow organisms to adapt to rapidly changing si tuations . Learn -
ing is not an alternative to an evolutionary explanation, it is a capac-
ity shaped by natural selection. Textbook s of animal behavior are 
now all grounded in evolutionary biology. 
Evolutionary Explanations for Social Behavior 
The evolutionary analysis of social behavior was centra l to transform-
ing animal behavior research . The old idea that organisms are shaped 
to behave in ways that b enefit their groups and specie s was replaced 
by recogn ition that selection generally shape s traits that maxi mize 
individual fitness , even if that harm s the group. Many have heard 
about lemming s jumping into the sea for the good of the group when 
food is too scarce for all to survive. This turns out to be a myth , one 
promulgated by a Disney film that seems to show lemmings flinging 
themselve s off a cliff , when in fact they were swept off by workers 
with broom s. An allele that induces individual s to sacrifice them-
selves for the good of the group will be quickly se lected out except 
in very special circumstances. Behaviors costly to individuals that 
benefit groups, such as parents sacrificing for their offspring, wolves 
sparing those who signal defeat, or crowded population s reducing 
reproduction , have other explanations. 
Kin Selection 
Recognition that costly individual sacrifices cannot routin ely be 
explained by benefits to others was followed closely by William Ham-
ilton 's discovery of the main exception, kin selection. Close relatives 
share genes that are identical by descent; 50% of a child's genes are 
identical to each of its parents. Alleles that decrease an individual's 
number of offspring can be selected for if they sufficiently benefit 
identical alleles in kin. Hamilton's famous formula, C < B x r, is a 
crucial foundation for understanding family relationships. An action 
that costs an amount C can nonetheless give inclusi ve fitness benefits 
if the cost to self is less than the benefit to a relative, B, times the 
percenta ge of genes identical by descent. The term "inclusive fitness" 
incorporates action s that increase the reprodu ction of an individual's 
relatives, as well as the individual. Kin selection offers a profound 
evolutionary explanation for basic human behaviors, such as parents 
making sacrifices that benefit their children. 
This discovery led to thinking in terms of "selfish genes." The 
metaphor has been useful to combat naive group-selection thinking, 
but it has been somewhat too potent for its own good. If genes are 
selfish, this seems to imply that organisms must be selfish. How-
ever, capacities for generosity and moral behavior exist because they 
increase inclusive fitness. Selfish genes make individuals who can be 
generous ... selectively. 
Evolutionary Medicine 
Natural selection shapes traits that work well, so it would seem 
unable to explain diseases. That's correct-diseases are not shaped by 
natural selection . However, traits that leave individuals vulnerable to 
disease, such as the appendix, the narrow birth canal , and the capacity 
for low mood, have been shaped by natural selection. Evolutionary 
medicine tries to understand, for each disease, why se lection has left 
bodies vulnerable . Six main kinds of explanation he lp to organize the 
search . Notice that these are not explanation s for why some individu. 
a ls become ill while others do not. Instead, they are abou t why all 
humans share vulnerability to a disord er. 
Six evolutionary explanations for vulnerability: 
I. Mismatch with modem environments 
2. Constraints- things selection cannot do 
3. Coevolution with fast-evolving pathogens 
4. Trade-offs 
5. Reproduction at a cost to health 
6. Defenses that are useful but costly and aversive 
Mismatch of Environment o Body. The bulk of chronic 
disease results from the mismatch between the human body and the 
very pleasant environmen ts humans have created for themse lves. Ath-
eroscleros is, breast cancer, and autoimm une disease s are vastly more 
common in technologica l societies . So are obesity, eating disorders, 
alcoholism, and drug abuse. Human behavior regulation mechanisms 
were never shaped to cope with the read y availabi lity of hamburg-
ers, candy bars, whiskey, and heroin. Our distant hum an ancestors 
also never had to cope with life in bureaucracies, 9-to-5 jobs, alarm 
clocks, and expecta tions of li fetime monogamous mating. 
Many alleles that predispose to major disorder s are not defects, 
they are merely genetic "quirks" that cause harm only in modem 
environments. For instance, nearsightedness is highly heri table, but 
nonetheless rare in hunter-gatherer populations not exposed to read-
ing early in life. Other heritable tendencies may have vastly different 
significance in mod ern environmen ts . For instance, attent ion deficit 
disorder may not have posed serious problems for hunter-gathe rers 
(or it may have been uncommon) . Some who advocate an evolution-
ary approach to mental disorders have attribu ted near ly all problems 
to a mismatch with modern environments. While such factors are 
significant, the five other factors are also impor tant. 
Pathogens Evolve Faster than Hosts. Infecti ous disease 
will always be present because pathogens evolve much faster than 
humans can. Also, every time selection shapes a host defense, patho-
gens evolve some way around it. The resulting arms race leaves us 
with costly defense mechanisms prone to cause disease . 
For instance, streptococ ci have evolved immune markers similar to 
human tissues, making it risky for the immun e system to attack them. 
Rheumat ic fever, Sydenham's chorea, and some cases of obsessive-
compulsive disorder are examples. 
Constraints. There are many things that natural selection 
cannot do. It can never completely preven t mutatio ns, although the 
extraordinary fidelity of DNA replication illustra tes the power of 
selection. Evolution also cannot redes ign a trait from scratch; it pro-
ceeds only by a process of small "tinkering" changes. So, while birth 
via the pelvis is painful and dangerous , no alternati ve route can evolve. 
Similarly, vertebrates are stuck with the blind spot where nerves and 
vessels enter an opening in the back of the eyeball , while cephalopods 
have nerves that traverse their eyeba lls withou t caus ing a blind spot. 
Trade-offs. No trait can be perfect. The vast majority of 
changes that could make a trait superior in one respect would make 
it inferior in other respects, or would comprom ise the effectiveness 
of other traits. Finches with larger beak s can crack tougher seeds. 
but they have less access to very fine seeds . Individuals with more 
4.1 Evolutionary Foundations for Psychiatri c Research and Practice 771 
tcmkm;y to anxiety arc able to avoid dangers, but at the cost of the 
inability to take advantage of many opportunitie s. 
Reproduction at the Expense of Health. It is disturbing 
to recognize that natural selection docs not shape organisms to maxi-
mize health, happiness , or longevity. It instead shapes organisms to 
maximize inclusive fitness. Usually health and long life arc good for 
fitness, however, an allele that harms health will nonetheless spread 
if it increases reproduction. 
The best example is the short lives of men compared to women. 
Male mortality rates in early adulthood are three times those for 
women because tendencies that lead to success in mating competi-
tion arc selected for in males even if they harm hcallh. Tendencies to 
tissue repair and sensible caution arc relatively favored in females. 
Much research has sought to understand the proximate mecha-
nisms that account for women having more anxiety disorders than 
men. An evolutionary framework suggests that it is men who have 
the problem. Women have closer to the optimal amount of anxiety for 
their own health and well-being. 
Some have speculated that tendencies to mania may have been 
selected for because they result in increased matings and increased 
reproductive success. If that were really the case, then the tendency 
would have spread and become universal. This provokes an inter-
esting possible explanation for the high prevalence of mild bipolar 
tendencies. However, the rarity of manic depression suggests that the 
increased sexuality of individuals with tendencies to mania has not 
paid off with net increases in numbers of grandchildren. 
Defenses. Most problems people bring to their physicians 
arc not direct manifestations of disease; they arc useful defensive 
responses, such as pain, fever, cough, nausea , and vomiting. These 
defenses, shaped by natural selection, are usually expressed only in 
the presence of some disease, but they are not diseases themselves. 
This knowledge is crucial for making good clinical decisions about 
when to block such defenses. 
The smoke detector principle is also crucial for making such deci-
sions well. Natural selection shapes mechanisms to regulate defenses 
so they arc expressed in situations where their benefits arc greater 
than their costs. However, information is often insufficient to be 
certain about the presence of a threat, so even an optimal system 
will have some false alarms, and some failures to respond when a 
response would be useful. Thi s is particularly germane for under-
standing panic attacks . A fight- flight response will be potentially 
life-saving if the noise from behind a rock is made by a lion, but it 
will be wasted if the noise is coming from a monkey. Whether an indi-
vidual should flee in a panic depends on how likely it is that the noise 
was from a lion. If the cost of flight is, for instance, JOO kcal, and 
the cost of not fleeing if the lion is actually present is I 00,000 kcal, 
then the optimal system will set off the fight- flight response when-
ever the noise is loud enough to indicate a probability of a preda-
tor being present of greater than one in 1,000 . This means that 999 
responses of 1,000 will be false alarms, each useless , but completely 
normal. False alarms in the system are expected and normal. This has 
profound implications for understanding panic disorder, and explain-
ing it to patients. 
CORE PRINCIPLES OF 
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 
Evolution has two major components , both discovered by Darwin. 
The first is the unity of all life; all individuals in all species are 
descendants of ancestors that go back in an unbroken chain to the 
origins of life on earth. This is phylogeny, now traceable via genom-
ics. It is relevant for tracing human origins, and for identifying the 
history of alleles related to mental disorders , but the focus here will 
be on Darwin's other discovery. Darwin's second disco very is natu-
ral selection and how it explains adaptations. It is the only viable 
explanation for why so many aspects of organisms are well-suited to 
coping with life's challenges. The rabbit's astute hearing, the wood-
pecker 's barbed tongue, and the eagle's sharp eyes are products of 
natural selection. So are human empathy, emotions, cognition, and 
capacity for language and love. Or, more exactly, the brain, and its 
mechanisms for regulating thinking, emotions, and behavior. 
Natural Selection 
Natural selection is best understood in the context of selection in 
general. If members of a group differ in ways that influence their 
likelihood of being in the group in the future, the group will change 
over time. If you put all coins from your pocket into a jar each eve-
ning and select only the silver-colored coins in the morning, the jar 
will gradually take on a copper hue as the concentration of pennies 
increases. Television producers try out extraordinarily varied offer-
ings. Those that get viewers and advertising dollars persist and 
arc imitated, others are eliminated. Selection explains how groups 
change when variations among individuals influence their contribu-
tions to future groups. 
Natural selection is the subtype of generic selection in which the 
variations are products of genetic variation that influence reproduc-
tive success. The principle is simple. If individuals in a population 
differ genetically in ways that influence how many surviving offspring 
they leave, the average characteristics of the population will change 
over the generations. This is not a theory, it is a theorem that is nece s-
sarily true. In the classic example, if previously light trees become 
covered with soot and moth color varies, light-colored moths are 
more likely to be eaten by birds, so the average moth will become 
darker over succeeding generations. VISTA is a useful mnemonic for 
the process of natural selection: Variation-Inheritance-Selection -
Time-Adaptation . 
Dogs offer a familiar example. From their common ancestors in 
wolves, artificial selection has produced dramatically diverse dog 
breeds in just a few thousand years. The process of natural selection 
is the same as breeding, except that differences in offspring numbers 
result not from decisions made by breeders, but from variations in 
ability to cope with life challenges that influence reproductive suc-
cess. The products of natural selection look as if they were designed, 
and the sequence of species makes it seem as if there is something 
planned, or at least preordained, about the progression. However, 
there is no plan or endpoint, and traits that appear to be designed 
were shaped by mindless natural selection. 
Standard examples usually describe how natural select ion changes 
a trait, however natural selection mostly keeps traits the same. If 
individuals 7-ft tall had more children than others, the mean height 
would shift to that optimum. If individuals more aggressive or outgo-
ing than others consistently had more children, the population mean 
would shift. However, at least over the past few tens of thousand s 
of years, individuals at the extremes of height, aggressiveness, and 
extroversion almost certainly had fewer offspring than those closer to 
the mean. The persisting wide variation in these traits suggests that 
fitness is similar across a wide range. 
Whether a trait or a gene is advantageous or deleterious depends 
on the environment. In equatorial climates, dark skin protects again st 
sun damage, in cloudy environments it can result in rickets from 
insufficient sunlight-induced vitamin D synthesis. A tendenc y to 
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prefer fatty foods can be useful where fat is scarce, but in modern 
environments it can lead lo disease. 
Evolution 
Evolution involves much more than natural selection. The three other 
main forces arc mutation, migration, and genetic drift. Mutations 
happen despite being minimized to an astounding degree by natural 
selection; increasing evidence points to their importance for explain-
ing schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Migration may strongly 
influence the prevalence of an allele in a population. Most northern 
Europeans can digest milk because migrants brought the relevant 
gene from rapidly expanding dairying populations further south. 
Huntington chorea is especially common near Lake Maracaibo in 
Venezuela because Antonio Justo Doria, a Spanish sailor, brought 
the mutation there in the late 1800s. Genetic drift refers to changes 
in gene frequency, more correctly allele frequency, that result from 
random factors. An allele that increases fitness may be lost from an 
entire population if the individuals carrying it all die in an accident. 
An allele that is mildly harmful can nonetheless become more com-
mon if those who carry it have more children than others just by 
chance. Alleles whose effects on fitness are close to neutral can drift 
to fixation or be eliminated, especially in small populations. There 
are good reasons why population genetics relics on the so-called 
"null model" in which frequency changes result only from drift. This 
is not, however, an alternative to natural selection or a reason to think 
that most traits are not well-suited to their functions. 
What Selection Shapes 
The usual textbook examples of selection are fixed physical traits 
such as bird beaks and moth wing color. Far more important for 
psychiatry, however, is selection for systems that regulate the body 
and behavior. Most regulation systems keep things stable. Selection 
shapes mechanisms to maintain homeostasis at every level. Regula-
tion of glucose, oxygen tension, acid-base balance, and osmolality 
are the usual examples. 
The association of natural selection with fixed traits and systems 
that maintain homeostasis fosters the misperception that an evolu-
tionary explanation somehow implies rigidity, especially rigidity of 
behavior. Nothing could be further from the truth. Natural selection 
has shaped hundreds of mechanisms that adjust organisms to chang-
ing situations. The traits vary in scale from the molecular to large-
scale behavior, and across time from instantaneous changes to those 
that play out over a lifetime. The term plasticity often refers to longer-
term changes, especially those that shape an individual in relatively 
irreversible ways as function of early experience, such as the barrel-
shaped chest of humans living at high altitudes. In the medium term, 
high altitude increases hemoglobin concentration, and exposure to 
sunlight induces skin tanning. In the short term, cold induces shiver-
ing, infection causes fever, and threat arouses fear. Some responses, 
such as blinking, are nearly instantaneous. All are facultative adap-
tations, mechanisms shaped by selection that adjust individuals to 
changing aspects of environments. 
The brain is obviously responsible for many such responses. It 
monitors internal and external cues as input to mechanisms that 
adjust physiology, expression, behavior, cognition, and more. These 
responses vary across individuals, and some of the variation results 
from genetic variation. To make a long story short, the brain was, 
like every other organ, shaped by natural selection. It's function is to 
regulate behavior and other responses in ways that maximize inclu-
sive fitness. Capacities for learning and relationships are especially 
valuable ways to accomplish that. I lumans have, perhaps uniquely 
among all animals, capacities for abstract representation that make 
language and causal thinking possible. I Iumans also have distinctive 
capacities for enduring relationships that go beyond merely trading 
favors. These capacities, in turn, make possible social complcxi. 
tics and cultures that create new selection forces, that further shape 
brains, in a feedback process that has shaped humans' astounding 
social and cognitive abilities. An evolutionary approach to human 
nature emphasizes the remarkable plasticity and adaptability of 
behavior to different circumstances. 
Genotypes and Phenotypes 
Natural selection changes gene frequencies, more accurately, allele 
frequencies. Population genetics describes how selection, migration, 
and genetic drift increase and decrease allele frequencies in differ-
ent specific situations. This sometimes gives the impression that 
evolutionary explanations are genetic explanations, and that gives 
the impression that an evolutionary approach to behavior somehow 
implies a commitment to genetic explanations for variations in per-
sonality and behavior. These are misconceptions. It is instructive to 
realize that Darwin knew nothing about genes. The principles of nat-
ural selection were discovered by observing variations in phenotypes. 
Genes carry the information that is acted on by natural selection, 
but that action is almost entirely via interactions of phenotypes and 
environments. Just as there is no such thing as a trait that is adaptive 
in general, there is no such thing as an allele that is useful in general; 
the adaptive significance of a genetic variation depends on interac-
tions with other genes (epistasis) and interactions with environments. 
Sexual Selection 
The interests of an individual and his or her genes are generally the 
same. An allele that makes healthy long-lived phenotypes is more 
likely to be passed on. There is, however, an exception. Mutations 
that decrease health, happiness, longevity, or cooperativeness will 
spread nonetheless if they increase the number of offspring. 
Sexual selection is the best example. It is the subtype of natural 
selection in which individuals compete for mates, either by display-
ing extreme traits that lead to being chosen by the other sex, or by 
traits that lead to success competing with others of the same sex. 
Gigantic colorful tails are a costly drag for peacocks, but the respon-
sible genes spread because peahens prefer peacocks with big tails. 
The process can set up a positive feedback loop in which the advan· 
tages of extreme male traits give advantages to female preferences 
for those traits, because sons with extreme traits will have an advan-
tage. The trait becomes more extreme until the costs it imposes are as 
large as the reproductive benefits. 
The relevance of sexual selection to humans is illustrated by the 
excess mortality rates experienced by men compared to women. In 
the early reproductive years in modem societies, men are three times 
more likely to die than females. Much of the excess is from fights 
and accidents, but almost all causes of death are greater for males 
because they allocate effort to competitive ability at the expense of 
tissue repair. Even early childhood mortality rates are 50% higher for 
boys than girls. 
Sexual selection is a subtype of social selection, the more gen· 
eral category of evolutionary change resulting from social choices 
and competitions. In sexual selection the resource at stake is mates. 
with its obvious connection to reproductive success. However, cspe· 
cially for humans, competition for status, friends and group member· 
ships also influences reproductive success. Individuals preferred as 
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relationship partners or group members get advantages substantial 
enough to shape extreme human capacities for altruism and empa-
thy unmatched by any other species. These advantages also help to 
account for extraordinary social sensitivity and the prevalence of 
social anxiety in humans. 
Many people experience extreme concern about what others 
think about them. The explanation is that other people's opinions 
can help or harm reproductive success. There are good evolutionary 
reasons why many psychiatric disorders arc associated with internal-
izing or externalizing personality extremes. There are good evolu-
tionary reasons to expect constant conflicts between (id) impulses to 
get short-term advantages and (superego) constraints that sacrifice 
personal short-term gain for longer-term benefits of being a pre-
ferred social partner. Rigidity that emphasizes one over the other is 
disadvantageous and is recognized as sociopathy and neurosis. Most 
people benefit from mechanisms shaped by selection that allow them 
to shift their social strategics as a function of subtle shifts in social 
circumstances. 
Levels of Selection 
Recognition that selection works mainly at the level of the gene and 
the individual has profound implications for psychiatry. While few 
evolutionary biologists now support the idea that traits are routinely 
selected to benefit the group or the species, consensus about levels 
of selection remains elusive, and the idea of group selection remains 
attractive to many nonbiologists. This may be, in part, because it is so 
often framed as an explanation for "the mystery of altruism." In an 
evolutionary framework, tendencies that benefit the genes of unrelated 
individuals more tl1an those of the actor will be selected against, while 
genes that benefit kin more than the actor can be selected for only if the 
cost/benefit ratio is greater than the percentage of genes in common. 
What about cooperation between those who do not share genes 
in common by descent? Many are "mutualisms" that give benefits 
to both parties with no opportunity for defection, such as two people 
moving a heavy rock to get food. Often, however, exchanges are not 
immediate, leaving the possibility that one partner will fail to recip-
rocate a favor. Such "reciprocity" exchanges have been subject to 
exhaustive modeling using the prisoner's dilemma schema. In this 
model, the largest payoff comes if the actor defects and the other 
person cooperates. If both cooperate, they both get a modest benefit. 
If both defect, neither gets any benefit. 
Because the cells in an individual's body are all genetically iden-
tical, their interests are almost always aligned with the welfare of 
the individual. However, some exceptions are particularly important 
for psychiatry. In particular, the interests of maternal and paternal 
genomes differ. Female mammals invest a proportion of their avail-
able resources in a pregnancy, reserving some for future offspring. 
The male parent may or may not be the parent of those future off-
spring, so the paternal genome gets an advantage if the fetus extracts 
a bit more nutrition from the mother. It may seem preposterous that 
maternal and paternal genomes should compete over relatively small 
differences of investment in an infant, yet intriguing genetic evidence 
suggests this is exactly what is happening. 
IGF-11 alleles tend to make offspring bigger. When they are passed 
on via an egg, they are imprinted, that is, methylated in a way that 
inhibits expression of the gene, thus making the baby smaller. IGF-
IIr alleles counteract the actions of IGF-II, yielding larger offspring. 
IGF-IIr alleles are imprinted if they come through the paternal line. 
The balance between these opposing forces yields babies of normal 
size, but if imprinting is missing for either gene, offspring will be 
especially small or large. 
Dernard Crespi has suggested that this phenomenon may be 
related to schizophrenia and autism. They can be viewed as flip sides 
of the same coin, with autism reflecting unbridled influences of the 
paternal genome, and schizophrenia reflects excess influences of the 
maternal genome. Genes that increase the risk of schizophrenia and 
autism arc imprinted in ways remarkably congruent with this theory. 
A recent study founc~ as predicted, that babies lighter than average 
were especially likely to develop schizophrenia, while those born 
heavier than average were more likely to develop autism. These find-
ings do not confirm the theory, but they do illustrate how to test a 
creative idea inspired by evolutionary thinking. 
A more mundane but nonetheless fascinating example is the 
weaning conflict. There is a period when mammal mothers try to 
stop nursing but infants protest vigorously and try to continue. This 
conflict is predictable from evolutionary principles. The mother and 
infant share 50% of their genes, but the infant shares 100% of its 
genes with itself. A mother that fails to nurse her infant loses a huge 
investment, so providing whatever her baby needs early in life is in 
the mother's genes interests. As the baby grows, it is increasingly able 
to get nutrition from other sources. At some point this means that 
the mother's reproductive success would best be served by another 
pregnancy. The baby's interests, however, are best served by continu-
ing to nurse until the point when the benefits via kin selection to a 
younger sibling (who shares 50% of genes) are as great as the ben-
efits from continuing to nurse. At this point cessation of nursing is 
in the child's interest, so the weaning conflict ceases. An extensive 
literature in psychoanalysis and child development investigates nurs-
ing and weaning, but much remains to be done to put it in an evolu-
tionary context. 
Misunderstandings about Natural Selection 
Some common misunderstandings about evolution deserve men-
tion. Is evolution over for humans? This idea that lower death rates 
end evolution reflects a deep misunderstanding of natural selection. 
Natural selection depends on differential reproductive success, not 
survival. If a heritable trait results in some individuals having fewer 
offspring than others, then natural selection occurs. Individuals with 
two different versions of a gene may have the same lifespan, but if 
one has more offspring, selection will take place. So long as heri-
table traits influence numbers of offspring, selection will continue to 
change the average characteristics of the human species. This does 
not meet that future traits can be predicted with certainty. Death from 
drunk driving is now a powerful selection force, but it is hard to say 
whether it will select for disliking alcohol or better driving while 
drunk. 
Can selection have any impact after menopause? Many people 
think not, but this is because they have not recognized the role of kin 
selection. Postmenopausal women can have a major influence on the 
proportion of their genes in future generations if they do things that 
help their grandchildren. Erickson's generative phase of life has an 
easy evolutionary explanation. Some have hypothesized that meno-
pause is an adaptation shaped by the advantages of taking care of 
existing children instead of undergoing the risks of reproduction at 
advanced age that might jeopardize the welfare of older children. 
Do all humans have Stone Age bodies and minds, unchanged 
for the past 10,000 years? No. Substantial changes have been doc-
umented; examples include changes in skin color, ability to digest 
lactose, and the ability of certain human subpopulations to cope with 
high altitudes. Increasingly complex social structures may also have 
imposed strong selection forces that have shaped social and emo-
tional traits and language abilities. Selection for behavioral traits may 
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have sped up since the development of agriculture changed human 
social structures. 
The opposite misconception, that selection changes traits in just a 
few generations, is also prevalent. However, selection is too slow to 
adjust the human body to environments that change drastically over 
just a few generations. Some people think that nearsightedness, a 
highly heritable trait, has become more common because the inven­
tion of eyeglasses has made it less of a disadvantage. However, a few 
hundred years is not nearly enough time for disadvantageous alleles 
to drift to a prevalence that would cause disability in about a third 
of the population. Myopia is a fine example of a "genetic quirk." 
The responsible alleles probably have disadvantageous consequences 
only when they interact with some modern environmental factor, 
possibly early reading, to cause pathology. One wonders how many 
alleles that predispose individuals to psychiatric disorders are also 
not defects, but quirks. 
Does an evolutionary view of behavior imply some kind of rigid­
ity or genetic determinism? Quite the opposite. Natural selection 
has shaped innumerable mechanisms that adapt bodies to current 
c ircumstances. Learning is not an alternative explanation for behav­
ioral traits, it is but one of many behavioral regulation mechanisms 
shaped by natural selection to adjust behavior to different circum­
stances. Similarly, culture is not an alternative explanation for the 
existence of behavioral traits, although it is obvious that culture has 
massive effects on behavior. The emergence of complex cultures has 
created new selection forces that have given humans capacities for 
culture unmatched by any other species. Gene-culture coevolution 
escalates human capacities for culture, which in turn makes more 
complex culture possible, in a positive feedback cycle whose end is 
not yet in sight. 
Much difficulty incorporating evolutionary biology as a basic sci­
ence for psychiatry arises because of perceptions that it is associated 
with atheism. While belief in God is less common among scientists 
compared to the general public, the fact that humans have been 
shaped by natural selection does not directly imply anything about 
the existence of God. It does contradict some myths that are inter­
preted literally by some religious traditions, however many religions, 
including the Catholic Church, now officially recognize that humans 
are products of natural selection. 
BEHAVIORAl ECOlOGY 
The synthesis of ethology with evolutionary biology produced the 
field now known as behavioral ecology. It analyzes how behavior pat­
terns influence fitness. Aside from the core principle that behavior 
tends to maximize inclusive fitness, behavioral ecology focuses on 
trade-offs between the different kinds of efforts individuals exert to 
get different kinds of resources. It routinely distinguishes several cat­
egories of effort. Somatic effort is to get calories and other resources 
to grow, sustain, and protect the body. Reproductive effort is to get 
mates, and to take care of offspring. Social effort is to recruit allies 
and to achieve status in the group. 
This framework offers a powerful tool clinicians can use to unpack 
the sources of stress. Most stress comes from inability to get a secure, 
sufficient supply of some resource, threat of Joss of a resource, or 
because efforts to get one resource interfere with efforts to get 
another. Examples abound in the clinic. One person may be work­
ing 70 hours a week, and feeling, correctly, that this makes searching 
for a romantic partner unrealistic. Another may be stressed because a 
commitment to full-time childcare makes it hard to allocate effort to 
anything else. Many people are distressed because of inability to find 
a mate, insecurity of a marriage, or wanting to leave a relationship. 
Many others are unable to find a satisfactory job, worried about losing 
a job, or feeling stuck in a position that provides little respect. 
Other problems arise from unbalanced allocations of effort. For 
some people money is the overwhelming goal, others are dedicated 
to being good, getting famous, having friends, or taking care of chil­
dren. The task of balancing efforts to get these various resources is 
constant, and imbalances create pathology. Narcissism can be viewed 
as investing all life effort in the pursuit of self and status to the exclu­
sion of all else. Conversely, some patients invest all effort into trying 
to please others. Some are preoccupied with their appearance, others 
with their wealth. Stress often arises from health problems that make 
it impossible to pursue other resources. 
To identify the specific source of life stress, one can ask, for each 
area, whether the person's life strategy is providing sufficient and 
secure sources of the resource. Few people ever have everything they 
want, securely and to full measure, but it is nonetheless useful to 
distinguish patients who have generally adequate sources for most 
of life's core resources, from those who are unable to get something 
crucial, from those who lack sources of most main life resources. 
Other animals face the same challenges. A grazing white-tailed 
deer looks up from the grass every few minutes to see if enemies 
might be present. Each time the animal looks up, it takes time away 
from eating. The allocation of effort between foraging and defense is 
regulated according to the level of nutritional supplies and the dan­
ger from predators . Risk-taking is also adj usted according to circum­
stances. B irds given a choice between a feeder that provides one seed 
every visit, and one that provides six seeds every sixth visit, generally 
prefer the steady payoff. I f, however, the temperature is lowered to a 
point where the steady payoff provides too few calories to survive 
through the night, they switch to the risky payoff because that at least 
offers some chance of survival. 
Studies of foraging also have important implications for psychia­
try. Food for most animals is distributed in patches, such as differ­
ent fruit trees. Starting in a new patch often provides many calories 
per minute, but as the patch is depleted, payoffs slow. How quickly 
should the animal move to the next patch? It depends on how long it 
will take to find a new one. Staying too long will waste time, resulting 
in very few calories per minute. Moving too quickly to a new patch 
will waste time looking for food when it could be spent gathering 
food. The optimum strategy is to continue in the current patch until 
the rate of return declines to that averaged over many patches. This 
is Charnov's marginal value theorem. Animals do not have to do cal­
culus to figure out the optimum moving time; their brains have been 
shaped by selection to optimize such choices to a remarkable degree. 
This is relevant for attention disorders and for mood. Consider the 
enthusiasm experienced upon first beginning to pick berries from a 
new bush, starting a new job, or engaging in a new relationship. Inev­
itably, payoffs decline with time. Deciding when to make a change is 
a difficult decision that often is the focus for psychotherapy. 
Reproductive Effort 
Brains result in behaviors that maximize inclusive fitness, a term that 
combines the reproductive success of an individual and his or her 
relatives. The simplest rule of thumb is that natural selection shapes 
brains that result in behavior that tended, in ancestral environments, 
to maximize the number of grandchildren, nieces, and nephews. 
This makes it seem as if everything depends on mating often 
and with many partners. Differences in reproduction are evolution's 
engine, but the notion that reproductive success is maximized by 
maximizing mating success is simplistic. Compared to chimpan­
zees, humans have a remarkable ability to selectively inhibit sexual 
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impulses. This ability must have given a selective advantage in the 
context of the mating patterns that developed during human evolu­
tion. 
Sex and mating behaviors have been a natural focus for behav­
ioral ecological study. There is no room here to expand on this topic, 
but it is important to recognize that the very existence of sex poses 
an evolutionary mystery because parthenogenetic populations grow 
twice as fast as sexual ones. Also important are the forces that shape 
many small gametes in one sex (e.g. sperm) and fewer larger ones in 
the other sex (e.g., ova). This is the essence of the difference between 
males and females. It means that different mating strategies maxi­
mize fitness for males as compared to females. Compared to males, 
female mammals invest much more in each offspring-many calo­
ries, and the time and effort of pregnancy-so the total number of 
possible offspring is quite limited. The investment of a male can be 
as little as a few sperm and a few minutes, so one man can have hun­
dreds of children, an outcome uncommon in technological cultures, 
but reported in cultures where agricultural surpluses made it possible 
for one man to have many mates. Variation in reproductive success 
is therefore potentially much larger for men; while some have many 
offspring, others have none. 
However, the human mating system is quite different from that 
of most other primates. In particular, men make major investments 
in rearing children. In this respect, humans are more like birds than 
most other mammals in that rearing offspring takes two parents. 
Chicks left alone in the nest without protection are likely to quickly 
be eaten by a predator, so a partnership is required for successfully 
rearing young. Human babies are so helpless, and their rearing takes 
so many years, that just having sex is rarely enough to successfully 
reproduce. 
Large investments in child rearing make sense for a man only 
if be can be relatively certain that the children are his own. So, 
tendencies to jealousy and mate guarding are human univer­
sals, although the range of accepted behaviors varies enormously 
between cultures, from death by stoning for what would elsewhere 
be dismissed as mere flirtation, to extramarital sex being acceptable 
in some situations. 
These distinctive aspects of the human niche are likely related to 
another human peculiarity-human ovulation is concealed instead of 
being advertised, as it is in many species. This may have increased 
paternity certainty by drastically lowering the benefits of any forced 
copulation by a man who is not the woman's mate. 
These generalizations are too often pushed to an essentialized ver­
sion that purports to be THE normal human mating pattern, despite 
massive evidence for huge cultural variations in mating and family 
structures. Nonetheless, understanding the evolutionary origins of 
the human niche can be helpful in understanding marital conflicts, 
jealousy, and the complications of affairs and divorce. 
Life H istory Traits 
Traits such as the duration of gestation, rate of growth, age at matu­
rity, interbirth interval, duration of nursing, and rates of aging are 
aU shaped by selection. One particularly important dimension bas 
been called fast versus slow life strategy. ln environments where 
life is short, reproductive success is maximized by taking risks and 
reproducing early and often, investing less in each offspring. ln more 
secure environments, it is better to invest more in longer-term strate­
gies and invest more in each offspring. The wide range of human 
variation on this dimension has been proposed to result from a facul­
tative mechanism that responds to different environments by induc­
ing a faster or slower Life history strategy. 
Attachment 
John Bowlby's recognition of the adaptive value of mother-infant 
attachment marked the beginning of evolutionary approaches to psy­
chiatry. However, he worked before the major advances that revolu­
tionized the study of behavior, so it is not surprising that he and his 
followers have tended to see secure attachment as the norm, and other 
kinds as pathological. Secure attachment is best for mental health, 
but important recent work has suggested that anxious or avoidant 
attachment may give selective advantages in some situations. 
EMOTIONS 
Emotions are special modes o f  operation shaped by selection to cope 
with the challenges that arise in situations that have recurred for 
thousands of years. Like sweating, cough, and pain, they are faculta­
tive adaptations that are useful in certain situations. They evolve in 
concert with mechanisms that monitor for cues associated with the 
situations in which they are useful. Like all such responses, emo­
tional responses can be pathologically excessive or deficient. Deter­
mining if an emotional response is abnormal requires knowing the 
situation it has been shaped to cope with, and whether or not that 
situation is present. 
When a patient presents with pain, fever, or cough, clinicians 
search for what might be arousing the response, such as tissue dam­
age, infection, or foreign material in the lungs. When a patient presents 
with a negative emotion, the same kind of investigation is needed, but 
the search is more difficult. Instead of being aroused by tissue pathol­
ogy or infection, emotions are aroused by less tangible situations. 
Modem emotions theory emphasizes that the stimuli are not just cues; 
emotions arise from an individual's appraisal of what new information 
means for his or her ability to pursue personal goals. A thorough inves­
tigation of the context is essential to determine if an emotion is normal 
and useful, normal but useless, excessive, or deficient. 
Low mood and anxiety are the emotions that most often cause 
problems. Almost all effort to understand these disorders has focused 
on what is different about people who experience intense anxiety or 
low mood, compared with other people. An evolutionary framework 
suggests different questions. Why do the capacities for anxiety and 
low mood exist at all? In what situations are they useful? Why are the 
mechanisms that regulate them so vulnerable to failure? 
The most fundamental question is why emotions exist at all. 
Controversies about emotions distract from a growing consensus 
that they are special states shaped by natural selection along with 
regulation mechanisms that express a specific emotion in the situa­
tion where it gives a selective advantage. No one aspect of emotions 
is primary. Emotional states shift sensation, perception, cognition, 
behavior, physiology, motivation, and learning. Subjective experi­
ence is just one of many aspects of an emotion. 
Controversy about emotion has focused on whether they are best 
viewed as distinct categories (the basic emotions view), or whether 
they are best understood as positions on dimensions, such as posi­
tive versus negative, and aroused versus calm. Neither perspective 
is consistent with the evolutionary origins of emotions. Emotions 
are neither fully separate nor fully dimensional; they are overlapping 
clusters of changes that have evolved from previous emotions. See 
Figure 4. 1 - 1 .  
Some attempts to understand the utility o f  emotions have tried to 
map specific functions to specific emotions. However, most emotions 
serve multiple functions including motivation, communication, and 
changes in physiology and behavior. Emotions were not shaped to 
serve specific functions, they were shaped to increase the ability of 
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fiGURE 4.1�1. A phylogeny of emotions. 
an individual to cope with the many challenges that arise in a situ­
ation that has recurred over evolutionary time. Being chased by a 
predator happened often enough that it reliably evokes a coordinated 
suite of physiological behavioral and emotional changes, 01e fight­
flight response. Realizing one has broken a promise arouses guilt. 
Experiencing generous help arouses gratitude. The key to under­
standing an emotion is to undcrs!alld the situation it was shaped for. 
One profound implication for psychiatry is that negative emotions 
are useful. Their aversiveness is one aspect that contributes to their 
utility. Anxiety, low mood, jealousy, anger, and envy e.xist because our 
ancestors with a capacity for these emotions got a selective advantage 
compared with those who lacked them. Negative emotions seem path­
ological because they arc usually associated with untoward circum· 
stances, and because they are so painful and prone to interfere with 
important daily tasks. However, they exist only because they have been 
useful . . .  for human genes, even if not always for human individuals. 
Fear is useful in the face of threat. It mobilizes energy, cogni­
tion, and behavior to escape the danger. Like all adaptive responses, 
pathology can result from deficiencies as well as excesses. People 
with excessive anxiety crowd psychiatric clinics. People with defi­
ciency of the fear response, hypophobia, cope poorly with dangerous 
situations, but they rarely come for treatment. 
Anxiety is often distinguished from fear because it is aroused by 
less tangible dangers that arc distant or social. It is especially prone to 
be aroused by situations where an individual is tempted to do some­
Uling that might give a short-term advantage at a major social cost. 
Here too, pathology from excessive alll(iety, especially social anxiety, 
is obvious, while the costs of anxiety deficiencies are far less obvi­
ous, even though sometimes more devastating. People with social 
anxiety tend to seck treatment, those with deficient social �cnsitivity 
suffer major social losses. 
The value of low mood is much less obvious. The term low mood 
allows dcscrlp!ion of states of tow motivation, low self-esteem, and 
pessimism without the terminological tangles that accompany the 
word "depression." In what situation can sadness or low mood be use­
ful? Sadness is aroused by a loss. It helps lo recover, replace, or other· 
wise adjlrst to a loss. Low mood is �roused when efforts to reach a goal 
arc proving fruitless. That situation hns recurred millions of times for 
individuals in the course of human evolution. While simply persisting 
with a positive attitude seems intuitively attractive, that is not the best 
strategy when fomglng irl winter, I rapped in pursuit of an uninterested 
partner, or trying for the fifth year in. a row to get into medical school. 
In such situations it is best to pause, conserve energy, consider other 
strategies, and, if no route appears viable after all options have been 
explored, give up, and put energies toward a more achievable goal. 
A 20-yoor·old community oollcgc student requested help for moderately 
severe depression that was interfering with his abnfty to pass hi� coui'SC$. 
He said he had to stay in school or his fabulous girlfriend would leave him. 
When asked about the girlfriend, he said she was still in high school but 
planning afler graduation to �!lend a college called Vassar. He was dead 
set on persisting in school despite his failing grades in order to preserve 
the relationship. Medication a.nd psychotherapy were only modestly help­
ful over a 2-month period, but he returned ai 3 months ro report that hi> 
symptoms were gone and he had stopped his medication weeks ago. When 
asked about the girlfriend he said, "Oh, you mean the old girlfriend. She 
was too uppity for me, my new girlfriend is much more down to earth." 
Continued pursuit of an unreachable goal can escalate low mood 
into clinical depression. There are mnny possible reasons for inability 
to give up a goal. few parents are able to give up trying to get a child 
off of drugs or alcohol. Many individuals have identities so grounded 
in their careers that they persist despite years of failure. And ofien, in 
the face of impending divorce, one partner persists in trying to pre· 
serve the relationship, even as demoralization tmns into depression. 
Otl1er hypotheses about the origins of capacities for depression are 
·also under consideration. One is that depressive rumination is use­
ful for finding solutions to complex social problems. Another is that 
depression motivates looking inward at what one can do to avoid being 
expelled from a group. Another is fuat depression symptoms give ben· 
efits by manipulating others. A particularly influential and plausible 
proposal is summari�ed in the phrase "involuntary yielding." After 
losing a status competition, persisting in challenging the winner will 
likely bring more attacks or expulsion from the group. Experiencing 
oneself as helpless and lower status than one actually is can prevent 
such attacks. The relevant situation is pursuing an unreachable goal in 
the domain of status competition. Subtypes of low mood have been 
shaped to cope with the pursuit of different kinds of goals. 
Jealousy is aroused by a threat of loss of a mate or the mate's 
fidelity. Responsible for vast interpersonal problems and millions of 
murders, sexual jealousy is a toxic emotion. However, the situation 
of a mating relationship being threatened by an outsider has occurred 
so otten over human evolutionary history, with such extreme effects 
on reproductive success, that it bas shaped a specialized pattern of 
responses. The actions characteristic of jealousy are often unreason· 
able in the extreme, but game theory tells us that unpredictability 
is essential to a successful strategy. Being predictable rne11ns being 
manipulable. Not being fully aware of one's motives or able to control 
one's behavior may well be advantageous. Once again, the beMfits 
may be for one's genes, not necessarily for oneself. 
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l\1sitiYc ,•m,,ti,,ns :u� l'qually useful, even if not. unfortunately, 
��� l'l'llllll•'"· In s ituat i11ns charac-terized by short-term opportunities , 
�nthusiasm. risk-taking. and energetic initiative nrc all valuable. This 
su�csts that slwrt-tenn l)ppurtun ities will give rise to more cnthu­
�i:lsl\1 :m•l ctli1rt than ll\llg·lerm opportun ities. Excesses of positive 
1111'•\l t'lll\'ly m•lti\·ate treatment-seeking except when they go the 
�\l�l\ICS t\11111\f in 1\\ani:l. 
l'hc rcsmm::c� that in 11uencc human reproductive success nrc 
0\\'1'\\ h,·hningly stlcial. Sl\ specillc e mot ions were shaped to cope 
with tlu: situations that arise in relationships. The boxes of the pris-
111\Cr� diknuna knd themselves well to understanding the origins 
,,fs,,mc social emotions. The game is named for situations in which 
the "''Ike t1ll'cl' leniency to whichever of two suspects first confesses 
IlK' 1ktai ls of a crime. The dilemma arises because keeping quiet 
�suits in n modest pun ishment, but each prisoner knows that he 
will get n higher �ent�ncc it' the other confesses first to avoid any 
punishment. 
R�peatcd cooperat ion by both parties arouses friendship, loyalty, 
:mJ tn1st. lfyou coopcmtc when the other defects, anger is the reliable 
�$Ult. It signals that apologies nnd reparations arc required to pre­
scm: tl�t• rdationship. I t ulso may be accompanied by spite, motiva­
tillliS to h:mn the de lector even when the costs arc larger for the self. 
Thi$ npp:u"Cntly scn�clcss emotion gives advantages by its powerful 
:1bility tl\ keep others from defecting when they otherwise would. The 
g:u\1�'-theorctic best stmtcgy of doing what the other person did on the 
p�l'ious mo,·e is called tit-for-tat. It accounts for the runs of coopera­
tion and dd'cction seen in relationships (Table 4.1-2). 
RELATIONSHIPS 
Views of human relationsh ips as fully explained by kinship and reci­
procity arc grossly simplistic. A small research industry has grown up 
to try tu explain apparl.'nt anomalies o f  human social behavior, includ­
ing t�ndl.'ncies to coopcr.ltion even without guarantee of payback, 
willingness to punish dl.'fcctors even when that will harm the actor, 
and c:agl.'rncss for spiteful revenge that can have no direct payoff. 
A key to su�h anomalies is found in a variation on the core princi­
ple. Just as selection shapes bodies to maximize reproductive success, 
CI'Cil at a cost to lu:alth or longevity, it shapes minds and emotions 
to maximize reproduct ive success at the expense of rationality. As 
Robert Trivcrs pointed out in his preface to Tlze Selfish Gene, the idea 
that sl.'h:ction shaped us for objective thought is naive indeed. Often, 
espccblly in social situations, commitments beyond justification, 
and wishes for revenge beyond measure, are more useful. 
This has an importnnt implication for psychoanalysis and psy­
chotherapy in general. While self-knowledge is desirable and can be 
cnomlOusly helpful, lack of conscious access to one's own motives 
and c:motions may sometimes be adaptive. It has been suggested that 
the human capacity for psychodynamic defenses that maintain active 
rcp�ssion of memories and motives may give select ive advantages, 
not just by making life more bcnrablc . but also by influencing others. 
The field of sociobiology studies how natural selection shapes 
social bchnviors and resulting group behaviors. There is no room here 
to explore its well-developed framework; however, when a relation­
ship is nt the root o f  a clinical problem , as is often the case, a formal 
ana lysis of how that relationship is or is not working offers a solid 
stnrting place. This is very different from trying to understand the per­
sonality traits of the participants or the early events that lead to distor­
tions nnd rigid relationship strategies. Instead, it looks at the history 
and current state of exchanges and expectations in the relationsh ip. 
While this perspective is j ust beginning to be applied, some 
clinical phenomena arc readily approached from this point of view. 
for instance, the classic borderline personality pattern of excessive 
immediate intimacy and adulation, followed by disappointment and 
distnncing, reflects a rigid relationship strategy of intense personal 
commitment that, when not reciprocated, leads to rejection and 
anger. The pattern in neurosis is more one of trying always to please 
others, and being angry when they do not live up to expectations. 
EXPLAINING VULNERABILITY 
TO SPECIFIC DISORDERS 
Every medical disorder needs two kinds of explanation. First, a prox­
imate explanation for what aspect of the body's mechanism has gone 
awry, and why. Second, an evolutionary explanation for why natural 
selection has left the body vulnerable to this kind of failure. The six 
categories from evolutionary medicine help to explain vulnerab i lity 
to mental disorders, just as they do to other medical disorders. 
Disorders of Emotions 
As noted already for anxiety and mood disorders, emotional disor­
ders result from dysregulation of otherwise useful responses. This 
means that determining whether a particular emotion is normal or 
abnormal requires understanding the situation in which that emotion 
is useful, the cues that usually regulate it, and the presence or absence 
of that situation. Current DSM diagnostic criteria ignore context and 
attend only to frequency, severity, and duration of emotional symp­
toms. This works well at the extremes and increases diagnostic reli­
ability, but gives no guidance in the more common cases where it i s  
hard t o  decide i f  an emotion is normal or not. 
The tendency to automatically view negative emotions as path­
ological contributes greatly to this problem, as does the failure to 
recognize that emotional responses were shaped to benefit reproduc­
tive success, not individual welfare. The functional significance of 
negative emotions should in no way inhibit attempts to relieve them. 
The rest of medicine routinely provides relief from the suffering that 
accompanies normal pain, fever, cough, and other symptoms. Psy­
chiatrists should not be inhibited about relieving anxiety, low mood, 
and jealousy, even when they are normal responses. Having an evo­
lutionary perspective on the origins and functions of such emotions 
gives clinicians a framework for understanding the causes of such 
emotions, and when blocking a negative emotion might be unwise . 
A professional motorcycle racer requested treatment because he was 
unable to sleep or keep food down the night before a race. The problem 
started when a friend died in a crash. It became worse aficr another crash 
caused another friend to become quadriplegic. He denied symptoms of 
other disorders and denied problems with anxiety before his friend's 
crashes. He had predictable difficulty recognizing 1he potentially l ife­
saving nature of his anxiety. 
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The other categories of evolutionary explanation for vulner­
ability also apply for emotional disorders. Useless emotions can 
be aroused by aspects of modem environments, such as being 
trapped in a hierarchical bureaucracy. Emotions routinely involve 
trade-off's, with both costs and benefits from excessive or deficient 
expression. Finally, emotions all too often motivate behavior that 
is good for reproductive success, but bad for an individual 's health 
and well-being. Examples include sexual desires that cannot be sat­
isfied, j ealousy, envy, wishes for revenge, and ambitions that result 
in constant dissatisfaction. There are, unfortunately, good evolu­
tionary reasons why such emotions are prevalent, aversive, and hard 
to control. 
Schizophrenia 
Most of the variation in risk for schizophrenia results from genetic 
variation. Why did not natural selection eliminate the responsible 
alleles? Many have suggested possible advantages to those with the 
disorder, or, more plausibly, to their relatives. However, reproduc­
tive success for people with schizophrenia is a fraction of that for 
other people, and there is no documented advantage for relatives, 
so this hypothesis fails. Others have suggested that it is a disease of 
modem environments, but there is limited evidence for dramatically 
lower rates in nonindustrial societies. New genetic evidence finds that 
every identified common allele that increases schizophrenia risk has 
only a tiny effect. Larger effects are mostly due to rare copy-number 
variations. This pattern is exactly what one would expect if selection 
were continuously and efficiently purging vulnerability alleles from 
the genome. Increased rates of schizophrenia associated with older 
paternal age and runs of homozygosity further support the hypothesis 
that alleles predisposing to schizophrenia are in mutation-selection 
balance. 
This leaves open the question of why the cognitive system is so 
vulnerable to this particular kind of failure. One possibility is that 
some advantageous cognitive trait bas been pushed close to a fitness 
"cliff edge" beyond which fai lure is likely, just as strong selection 
for speed in race horses bas made their lower leg bones long, light, 
and thin, but vulnerable to breaking. The neural mechanism could 
involve neuron pruning, cortical folding, or any number of other traits 
that give major benefits up to some threshold beyond which failure 
becomes likely. 
Substance Abuse 
The devastation and early death resulting from substance abuse 
selects against the alleles that increase vulnerability. However, pure 
substances and means to administer them have been reliably and read­
ily available for far too little time for selection to have a big effect. 
From this perspective, vulnerability to substance abuse is a product of 
mismatch with modem environments. Chemicals mediate the brain 's 
motivation and learning systems, so it should be no surprise that 
exogenous chemicals can hljack those systems. The amazing thing is 
that so many people can use drugs and alcohol without major prob­
lems. Active efforts are underway to understand why some people 
have brain mechanisms that make them especially vulnerable. It 
would be most interesting to see how people with high and low levels 
of vulnerability behave in environments where substances of abuse 
are not readily available. Do they use different strategies when forag­
ing for food? Are their interpersonal relationshlps different? Answer­
ing these questions could lead to new behavioral tests that estimate 
vulnerability. 
Eating Disorders 
Anorexia and bulimia have likely become more common in the past 
century. The predisposing alleles are almost certainly quirks without 
major effects on fitness until they interact with modern environments. 
Developmental and personality factors strongly influence who gets 
an eating disorder. However, the shared human vulnerability seems to 
result from evolved nutrition regulation mechanisms interacting with 
novel environmental exposures. Good candidates include the ready 
availability of every imaginable kind of food, a resulting epidemic 
of obesity, and media that portray slimmer-than-real bodies. Most 
serious eating disorders are initiated by a strict diet. The resulting 
binge eating would be life-saving in a famine, but it causes panic and 
guilt in dieters, and increased resolve to more strictly restrict intake, 
creating a vicious cycle. 
Child Abuse 
It makes no evolutionary sense for parents to harm their own children. 
This led evolutionary psychologists to investigate whether the risk of 
death of a child depends on how it is related to the parents. The find­
ing is remarkable-death rates from child abuse are 80 times higher 
if there is a step-parent in the home. This research was inspired by 
studies of vervet monkeys that found infanticide to be routine when 
a new male takes over a harem. Eliminating nursing infants speeds 
return to estrus in the females, thus increasing the reproductive suc­
cess of the new male during the relatively brief window until another 
male displaces hlm. The different human mating system means that 
infanticide in humans gives no such advantage and was not shaped 
by selection. However, not being with both parents from the start 
seems to interfere with the bonding that usually protects children 
from harm. 
Extended early contact also seems to be the signal that makes 
parents and chlldren uninterested in each other as sex partners. For 
instance, children raised together from their early years in a kib­
butz experience embarrassment and disgust at the idea of marrying 
another member of the group. Over evolutionary time, this incest 
inhibition mechanism has increased reproductive success by reduc­
ing the risk of having children with many pairs of identical deleteri 
ous recessive genes. In this example, cultural prohibitions ampl i( 
already existing evolved inhibitions. The relevance to psychiatry 
all too obvious in cases where such inhibitions are weak because 
parent has little early contact with a child. It is interesting to consid1 
if the development of such inhibitions is related to early Oedip. 
wishes and their subsequent repression. 
Sociopathy 
The range of prosocial tendencies in humans is breathtaking. Som, 
individuals lie awake nights wondering if some small oversigr 
might have caused others inconvenience, whlle sociopaths take pie' 
sure in deceiving others and sadistically causing them pain. In th 
case, selection seems not to have settled on a narrow optimal mea 
Frequency-dependent selection has been proposed as a possib 
explanation. 
If people with sociopathlc tendencies do well in groups whc 
there are many cooperators to exploit, but badly in groups wher 
many others are also sociopathic, this could maintain a small propo. 
tion of sociopaths in the population. Their tendency toward sexu:• 
license and lack of commitment to families and children could gi' ' 
an advantage until the proportion of sociopathic individuals becomes 
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high enough that they must deal with each other, and until  coopera­
tive individuals have developed strong abilities to detect: and ovoid 
them. This hypothesis is supported by the high heritabi lity for soci­
opathy, but it is undermined by evidence for minor neurologic abnor­
malities in many such individuals, and by t.he role of curly abuse and 
neglect. From a longer-term perspective, the presumed relat ively 
recent evolut ion of strong prosocial tendencies may turn out to be 
important. Note that these evolutionary explanations say little about 
why some people become sociopathic and others do not. They only 
explain how extreme prosoc ial traits may give selective advantages, 
and why not al l  individuals may have such traits. 
Personal ity Disorders 
Other personality d isorders are also characterized by rigid 
extremes of social  strategies. People with obsessive-compulsive 
personality traits do their duty to an extreme, expect others to be 
equally conscientious, and are constantly d isappointed. Ordinary 
neurotics are not so rigid, but they also invest huge proportions of 
l ife effort into trying to please others, and they also often experi­
ence disappointment. Those with paranoid tendencies expect that 
others w i l l  deceive or harm them, and their lack of trust means 
they have difficu lty finding relationship partners who can correct 
their misperception. Those with anxious, avoidant personal ities 
invest vastly excessive proportions of l ife energy into protecting 
against possible harm in general .  Dependent personality tenden­
cies result in overwhelming i nvestments in particular relationships, 
and in preserving those relationships. From an evolutionary point 
of v iew, personal ity disorders are not interpreted as adaptations, 
but as extremes of normal personal ity dimensions that reflect dif­
ferent social strategies. 
FUTURE D I R ECTIONS 
The evolutionary foundations for psychiatry provide a n  i nvaluable 
framework for understanding behavior, relationships, and emotions. 
Clinicians who understand the evolutionary origins and functions of 
emotions have tools that allow them to better understand disorders of 
emotions. Those who understand the evolutionary origins of capaci­
ties for relationships are better able to deal with problematic rela­
tionships and the emotions they arouse. Those who understand how 
natural selection has shaped extreme prosocial tendencies in humans 
are better able to understand social anxiety and neurosis. Those 
who recognize personality characteristics as social strategies have a 
framework for understanding personality disorders. Most globally, 
clinicians who grasp the distinction between proximate and evolu­
tionary explanations are well prepared to integrate their knowledge 
of factors increasing risks for individuals with their knowledge about 
the evolutionary reasons why all members of the species are vulner­
able to a particular disorder. 
The implications for research are perhaps even more important. 
Huge efforts to try to identify specific disorders based on specific 
brain abnormalities wi l l  eventually succeed for some disorders, but 
others will turn out to be, l ike epilepsy or congestive heart fai lure, 
failures in evolved systems that can have many causes. Severe brain 
disorders such as autism and schizophrenia may turn out to have a 
specific, consistent neuropathology, but an evolutionary view sug­
gests that there should be openness to the possibility that they result 
from systems that have been pushed by selection close to some fit­
ness c l iff edge, or that they are otherwise intrinsically vulnerable to 
fai lure for other good evolutionary reasons. 
779 
J rnplieot ions for studies of treatment nrc Aubstnntlnl .  ' tudlcs of 
drugs to relieve emol'ionol su n'cring oro on en framed 08 norma lizing 
neurotrnnsm i ttcr abnormuli tics. H owever, recognizing that oven neg· 
ut-ivc emotions nrc useful suggests that drugs relieving aversive erno· 
t ions nrc like drugs that relieve cough or fever by blocking normal 
mediating mechnnisms. tudics of cognit ive-behoviornl in terven­
tions increasingly go beyond simple leurning theory to olso consider 
social factors that in fluence sehemas, und the udvuntnges us well ns 
the disndvantagcs of distorted thinking. They nlso increasingly rcc· 
ognize the power of sociul groups and relationships to get people 
to carry out behovioral exerc ises that arc eli fficult, but essen t ia l .  
Interpersonal therapy analyzes social roles and conflicts that ulmost 
invariably involve struggles t:o get impot·tant reproductive resources, 
and trade-off's among con flicting strategies, roles, nnd relationships. 
This cha pter prov ides only the briefest sketch of n busic sci­
ence whose impl ications for psychiatric reseurch and treatment ore 
just beginning to be explored. Recogn izing the opportunities will  
lead to increased support for research that should result  in maj or 
advances. 
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• 4.2 Neurocentrism: 
I mpl ications for Add iction 
and the Courtroom 
SALLY L.  SATEL, M.D., AND SCOTT 0. LlLIENFELD, PH.D. 
In the early 2 1 st century, neuroscience has captured the public imagi­
nation like never before. Understanding the brain is helpful, perhaps 
essential, to developing treatments for devastating illnesses like 
schizophrenia and Parkinson's. More abstract but no less compel­
ling, the functioning of the brain is intimately tied to one's identity, 
memories, and aspirations. But the excitement to explore the brain 
has spawned a new fixation that one might call neurocentrism-the 
view that human behavior can be best explained by looking solely or 
primarily at the brain. 
In the view of some critics neurocentrism poses a threat to psy­
chiatry because it risks oversimplifying a number of complex issues. 
In its extreme form, it devalues the importance of psychological 
explanations and environmental factors, such as familial chaos and 
stressors, understanding disturbances of mood, thought, and overt 
behavior. In turn, neurocentrism may pose a distraction from seeking 
effective and perhaps more enduring solutions, including psycho­
therapies, and may imply that pharmaceutical approaches should be 
first-line intervention for addictions and other behavioral problems. 
The prime impetus behind this enthusiasm is functional mag­
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) and the now-iconic, vibrant brain 
images that grace the science pages of the daily newspaper. Author 
Tom Wolfe was characteristically prescient when he wrote of fMRI 
in 1 996, just a few years after its introduction, "Anyone who cares to 
get up early and catch a truly blinding twenty-first century dawn will 
want to keep an eye on it." Why the fixation? First, there is the very 
subject of the scans: the brain itself. More complex than any structure 
in the known cosmos, the brain is a masterwork of nature endowed 
with cognitive powers that far outstrip the capacity of any silicon 
machine built to emulate it. Containing roughly 85 billion brain cells, 
or neurons, each of which communicates with thousands of other 
neurons, this 3-lb universe cradled between the ears has more con­
nections than there are stars in the Milky Way. How this enormous 
neural edifice gives rise to subjective feelings, a question often called 
the "hard problem" of consciousness, is one of the greatest mysteries 
of science and philosophy. Combine this mystique with the simple 
fact that multicolored pictures-in this case, brain scans--can be 
powerful. Of all the human senses, vision is the most developed and 
occupies the largest share of cortical space. 
There are good evolutionary reasons for this arrangement: The 
major threats to primate ancestors were apprehended visually, as 
were their sources of food. Plausibly, the survival advantage of vision 
gave rise to man's reflexive bias for believing that the world is as he 
or she perceive it to be, an error that psychologists and philosophers 
call naive realism. This misplaced faith in the trustworthiness of 
one's perceptions is the wellspring of two of history's most famously 
misguided theories: that the world is flat and that the sun revolves 
around the earth. For thousands of years, people trusted their raw 
impressions of the heavens. Yet, as Galileo understood all too wel l , 
the eyes can deceive. He wrote in his Dialogues of 1 632 that the 
Copernican model of the heliocentric universe commits a "rape upon 
the senses"-it violates everything the eyes reveal. 
Trusting the patterns on brain scans to reveal nuanced mental 
contents is a form of neurorealism, a term coined by University of 
Montreal researcher Eric Racine. A first cousin of naive realism, neu­
rorealism denotes the fallacious but tempting propensity to regard 
brain images as inherently more "real" or valid than other types of 
behavioral data. As Stanford neuroeconomist Paul Zak has described 
his work on the neurobiology of trust, a brain scan "lets me embrace 
words like 'morality' or 'love' or 'compassion ' in a non-squishy way. 
These are real things." Or take the psychological impact of com­
bat. A researcher at the Minneapolis VA tells TIME magazine that 
claimed that brain imaging confirms that posttraumatic stress dis­
order (PTSD) is a "real disorder." In both quotes, it is not clear that 
brain images provide with novel information; such images are not 
required to conclude that love or PTSD is genuine. 
As a tool for exploring the biology of the mind, neuroimaging has 
given neuroscience not merely a huge scientific boost but a strong 
cultural presence. As one scientist remarked, brain images are now 
"replacing Bohr's planetary atom as the symbol of science." With 
its implied promise of decoding the brain, it is easy to see why brain 
imaging would beguile almost anyone interested in pulling back the 
curtain on the mental lives of others: politicians hoping to manipulate 
voter attitudes, marketers tapping the brain to learn what consumers 
really want to buy, agents of the law seeking an infallible lie delt' · 
tor, addiction researchers trying to gauge the pull of temptatio 
psychologists and psychiatrists seeking the causes of mental illm 
and defense attorneys fighting to prove that their c lients lack mal 
intent or even free will. At the same time, this fascination is a dout 
edged sword, as it may lead eager audiences to accept dubious net• 
science claims without adequate scrutiny. 
Some misapplications of neuroscience are merely amusing n 
may be essentially harmless. Take, for instance, the new trend 
neuro-management books, such as one entitled Your Brain a .  
Business: The Neuroscience of Great Leader. The latter advi� 
nervous CEOs "to be aware that anxiety centers in the brain c 
nect to thinking centers, including the PFC (prefrontal cortex] a 
ACC [anterior cingulate cortex]." The fad has, perhaps not surpr 
ingly, infiltrated the parenting and education markets, too. Pare· 
and teachers are easy marks for "brain gyms," "brain-compatil 
education," and "brain-based parenting," not to mention dozens 
other unsubstantiated techniques. Although these methods may r 
be dangerous per se, they may incur both direct financial costs a: 
opportunity costs arising from a failure to seek out more efficaci01 
interventions. 
For the most part, these enterprises merely dress up or repackagl' 
good advice with neuroscientific findings that add little or nothing to 
the overall program. As one cognitive psychologist quipped, "Unable 
to persuade others about your viewpoint? Take a Neuro-Prefix­
influence grows or your money back." But reading too much into 
brain scans can be a problem when real-world concerns hang in the 
balance. Consider the law. When a person commits a crime, who is 
at fault: the perpetrator or his or her brain? This is a false choice. 
If biology teaches anything, it is that "my brain" versus "me" is a 
false distinction. Still, if biological roots can be identified-and bet­
ter yet, captured on a brain scan as juicy blotches of color-it is toO 
easy for nonprofessionals to assume that the behavior under scrut inY 
